Simulating the Lisbon skills targets in WorldScan by Bas Jacobs
  1 
Simulating the Lisbon skills targets in WorldScan 
 
This paper explains the theoretical background, the analytical methods, calibrations, 
assumptions and computations of the skill inputs for the WorldScan analysis on the skills 
targets of the Lisbon agenda. The Lisbon skills targets are implemented in WorldScan using 
most recent theoretical and empirical research in human capital theory. In particular, a satellite 
model for WorldScan is developed which disaggregates high skilled labour in S&E and non-
S&E workers, and low skilled labour in workers with primary education (or less), lower 
secondary education, and higher secondary levels of education. In addition, workers can acquire 
skills through on-the-job training. The quality of the workforce may also increase by a higher 
quality of initial education. Finally, a stylised cohort model is developed to capture the time-lag 
between changes in policies and the eventual impact on the labour force. In implementing the 
skills targets we take heterogeneity between various EU countries into account with respect to 
the following skill variables: initial average levels of education, the returns to education, 
graduation rates in upper-secondary education, participation in on-the-job training, and the 
graduation shares in S&E education.
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1  Introduction 
This  document  explains  the  theoretical  background,  analytical  methods,  calibrations, 
assumptions  and  computations  of  the  skill  inputs  for  the  WorldScan  analysis  on  the  skills 
targets  of  the  Lisbon  agenda.  These  computations  are  carried  out  for  the  Competitiveness 
Report of DG Enterprise. The chapter analyses five targets of the Lisbon agenda by means of 
what-if  simulations  with  the  WorldScan  model.  The  Lisbon  agreement  concerns  targets  on 
skills. The Lisbon agenda mentions the following goals in this respect: 
1.  By 2010, an EU average rate of no more than 10% early school leavers should be achieved. 
2.  By 2010, at least 85% of 22 year olds in the European Union should have completed upper 
secondary education. 
3.  By 2000, the percentage of low-achieving 15 year olds in reading literacy in the European 
Union should have decreased by at least 20% compared to the year 2000. 
4.  By 2010, the European Union average level of participation in Lifelong Learning should be at 
least 12.5% of the adult working age population (25-64 age group). 
5.  The total number of graduates in mathematics, science and technology in the European Union 
should increase by at least 15% by 2010 while at the same time the level of gender imbalance 
should decrease. 
 
The current state of affairs in the EU countries can be found in Commission Staff Working 
Paper: Progress towards the common objectives in education and training, SEC(2004) 73. 
Currently, WorldScan (WS) uses production functions with two skill levels, which 
correspond with: 
·  Low skilled: ISC levels 01 + 2 + 34, so all up to and including completed secondary education. 
·  High skilled: ISC levels 5 + 6: tertiary education. 
 
Effects on productivity and wages result from shifts between low and high skilled labour. 
However the above targets induce no shifts between skill levels in WS. Targets 1 - 3 concern 
shifts within the low skilled category, target 5 concerns a shift within the high skilled category 
and target 4 may relate to both categories but will hardly induce any shifts between categories. 
To compute the impact of reaching the targets on education and training we developed a 
small, independent ‘satellite model’ to WorldScan, which incorporates various aspects of skill-
formation needed to simulate the targets. This extension allows for three disaggregated skill 
groups at the lower education level and distinguishes between two types of higher educated 
workers: non-science&engineering (S&E) and science&engineering workers. Furthermore, the 
satellite model captures on-the-job-training and the quality of education in a rudimentary, but   4 
consistent, fashion. And, finally, a simple flow-approach to the labour market is introduced to 
capture the time-lags of policy changes on aggregate macro-economic outcomes. 
In particular, we first apply nested CES sub-production functions within each aggregate skill 
group to capture the heterogeneity in skill-levels. Subcategories of labour are nested in the low 
and high skilled categories. We allow for three types of lower education (ISC01, ISC2, ISC34) 
and two types of higher education (ISC56: non-S&E and S&E students). These sub-production 
functions are calibrated on the basis of substitution elasticities and returns to education that are 
found in the literature. It was not to explicitly include these lower level CES functions in the 
full WS-model due to time limitations. Our WorldScan skill ‘sub-block’ allows for simulations 
of each of the Lisbon-targets. We compute the difference between the current state of affairs in 
each of the EU member state and the Lisbon targets. We then use the developed methodology to 
compute inputs for the WorldScan model for each country. 
Second, we incorporate on-the-job training to capture life-long learning effects. We use a 
short-cut to incorporate on-the-job training by allowing for growth in the number of efficiency 
units of human capital. Changes in life-long-learning patterns translate in higher growth rates of 
human capital stocks. Furthermore, we capture ‘skill-begets-skill’ effects of human capital 
gathered on the job (cf. Heckman, 2000).  
Third, the quality of formal education may improve so that the levels of human capital of 
future cohorts entering the labour market increase compared to current cohorts. We simply use 
an index for educational quality which we adjust as a consequence of the literacy target. 
The fourth and last aspect of implementation is the time lag between formal education and 
the skill structure of the labour force. It takes many years before the skill structure of the labour 
force has adjusted to the higher educated cohorts that leave formal education. To take this into 
account a stylised cohort model is used to compute the impact of reaching the targets in 2010 on 
the skill structure of the labour force in the period 2010-2040. Moreover, we allow countries to 
‘catch up’ towards steady state levels of education in the work force. For example, the 
graduation rates in higher education are typically still above the fractions of higher educated 
workers in the population. Hence, the share of higher educated works in the population still 
increases in the absence of the Lisbon targets. We acknowledge an important caveat at the 
outset. Our simplified demographic structure is a crude approximation to reality because we 
assume that all cohorts are equally sized. Although the simulations of the skills model are 
somewhat sensitive to the underlying demographic assumptions, this approximation affects the 
baseline time-paths and the Lisbon time-paths for the workforce equally. As such, the 
demographical assumptions will not create a systematic bias when comparing the Lisbon 
simulations with those of the baseline. 
Further, the implementation has a regional dimension as well. European Commission (2004) 
shows that countries differ with respect to their initial position vis-à-vis the targets. At the same 
time, European Commission (2004) emphasises that the targets apply to the EU as a whole and   5 
not to individual countries. In accordance with the other Lisbon simulations we follow a general 
rule to compute country specific targets. We set an upper limit above the Lisbon-target, which 
is above the highest initial level observed for all countries as individual countries sometimes 
exceed the targets in the baseline years. We then set the target for a country proportional to the 
distance of the initial value and the upper limit. This is the same procedure that has also been 
applied for the employment and the R&D target. In this way countries that are at the largest 
distance from the target have to make the largest effort. At the same time, because the upper 
limit exceeds the target, countries that have reached or exceeded the target are still assumed to 
make some (although generally small) effort. The only exception to this rule is the target on 
mathematics, science and technology graduates. European Commission (2004b) specifies this 
target as a percentage change and we uniformly apply that change to all countries. 
Differences between countries’ levels of education generate differences in returns to 
education. Returns to education are high (low) in countries with a low (high)-skilled labour 
force (see Harmon et al., 2003, in particular p131). To capture this, we calibrated country 
specific returns to education that depend on the difference between the average number of years 
of schooling of a country’s labour force and the average number of years of schooling in the 
EU. One year less (more) schooling compared to the EU average yields one percent higher 
(lower) return to education. Finally, to calibrate the stylised cohort model we calculate country 
specific inflow and outflow rates from the population projections in the WorldScan base path. 
That has been done for each country according to two criteria. Firstly, population growth in the 
stylised model has to equal the average rate of population growth until 2040 in the base run. 
Secondly, the outflow rate in the stylised model has to equal the average outflow rate out of the 
population between 25 and 64 years of age in the base projection of WorldScan. 
The satellite model calculates a time path of the increase of labour efficiency that originates 
from Europe reaching the skill targets in 2010 by combining disaggregated skill categories, on-
the-job training and quality of education with a stylised cohort model. This increase in labour 
efficiency is subsequently inserted in the WorldScan model, which computes the general 
equilibrium effects of the education and training policies. 
The what-if character of the simulations implies that we do not explicitly deal with the 
policies required to reach the targets. Nevertheless, some simulations still capture the most 
important costs of achieving the skills targets, namely the opportunity costs of increasing levels 
of education and the opportunity costs of acquiring more skills on the job. In particular, raising 
the number of better skilled workers in the population automatically implies that there are less 
low skilled workers available. Also, increasing training efforts will automatically imply lower 
labour earnings in the short run as workers spend less time being productive when they spent 
their time accumulating human capital. However, we ignore the direct and institutional costs 
associated with larger levels of investment in formal schooling and training. In addition, the 
policy costs are not taken into account of increasing literacy levels and of shifting the   6 
composition of graduates from non-S&E to S&E fields. The economic costs of reaching the 
skill-targets are likely to be too low in the simulations. Further, a large number of uncertain 
parameters are involved in the simulations. Wherever possible we have chosen the most 
plausible values known from the economic literature. In many instances, parameters are not 
precisely known and set them at values we consider optimistic. Consequently, the effects of 
reaching the Lisbon targets are likely to be overestimated. Therefore, one can view our 
simulations as a rosy picture of reaching the Lisbon targets on skill formation because we are 
likely to underestimate the costs and overestimate the effects. 
This note describes the methods and assumptions used in the simulations. In section 2 we 
describe the disaggregation procedure. In section 3 we introduce on-the-job training. In section 
4 we analyse the cohort effects on the labour market. In section 5 we present the simulations 
that are used in WorldScan and the results for the skill ‘sub-block’.   7 
 
2  Disaggregating skill-groups 
This section explains how the skilled and unskilled groups of aggregate labour are 
disaggregated to allow for the three types of low skilled labour (ISC01, ISC2 and ISC3) and 
two types of skilled labour (non-S&E and S&E workers). For convenience we introduce 
notation first: 
 
·  c t H ,  aggregate skilled workers at time t in country c. 
·  c t
i H ,  skilled workers of type i at time t in country c, i = 1,2 ( i =1: non-S&E graduates (ISC 
56), i = 2: S&E graduates (ISC 56). 
·  c t L ,  aggregate unskilled workers at time t in country c. 
·  c t
i L ,  unskilled workers of type i at time t in country c, i = 1, 2, 3 (i = 1: only basic education or 
less (ISC 01), i = 2: lower secondary education (ISC 2), i = 3: higher secondary education (ISC 
3)). 
·  c t
H w ,  aggregate skilled wage rate at time t in country c. 
·  c t
L w ,  aggregate unskilled wage rate at time t in country c. 
·  c t
i H w ,
,  skilled wage rate of type i at time t in country c, i = 1, 2. 
·  c t
i L w ,
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º b  constant (over time) ‘Mincer’ rate of return in country c of sij years more 
education from type i to type j.
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high skill-types i and j for i,j = 1, 2, and i ≠ j. 



















- º s  constant (over time and countries and between low skill-types) elasticity 
of substitution between low skill-types i and j for i,j = 1, 2, 3, and i ≠ j. 
 
1 The Mincer return to education equals the internal rate of return of increasing educational levels if direct costs are 
negligible and lives of individuals are infinite. The depreciation rate of human capital is included in estimates of the return, 
i.e., it is a net-return. Heckman et al. (1998) moreover suggest that depreciation rates are approximately zero.   8 
We drop time and country indices in the remainder of this section. 
Let the aggregate production function be defined over aggregate skilled labour H aggregate 
unskilled labour L, and other inputs like capital (denoted by the vector X): 
). , , ( X AL ABH F  
A is a general efficiency parameter denoting the efficiency of total labour input. B is a 
parameter denoting skill-biased technical change.
2 In the first stage, firms maximise profits 
which are equal to total revenues pF(.) minus wage costs (and other outlays on factors of 
production C(X) where C(X) is the cost function with C’ > 0, C’’ < 0   
), ( ) , , ( X C L w H w X AL ABH pF L H - - - = P  
where wH and wL denote the aggregate skill prices for skilled and unskilled labour respectively. 
First-order conditions for profit maximisation give the following factor pricing equations for 
skilled and unskilled labour: 
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WorldScan assumes that high and low skilled workers are nested through a CES sub-production 
function G(.)  
( ) ( ) , ) , (
/ 1 r r r a a L BH A L BH AG L H + º  
and ρ ≡ 1 – 1/σ, αH + αL = 1. Consequently, we can write F(ABH, L, X) ≡ F(AG(BH, L), X) and  
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The correct share parameters αH and αL are generally unknown. If we know the share 
parameters and the elasticity of substitution we can fully specify the sub-production function 
G(.). We apply the ‘Mincer’ rates of return to various types of education to identify the share-
parameters in general equilibrium up to the elasticity of substitution. We then fix the elasticity 
of substitution at some reasonable value to fully specify the aggregate sub-production function. 






























2 We require that the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour is larger than one for this to work, i.e., 
σ > 1. Only in this case, the income share of skilled workers increases if B increases. This can be checked using routine 
algebra. σ > 1 is empirically plausible, see Jacobs (2004). 
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Taking logs from both sides and recognising the fact that the Mincer return to education equals  
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Rewriting the last expression gives 
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We can solve this equation to find the shares αH and αL in the macro-production function as 
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where  
( ) B s
L
H
H L H L ln ln ) 1 ( , , r r b x - - + º   
Note that the shares are dependent on both the relative supplies (H/L) and the level of skill-
biased technical change B in the calibration year (B = 1). 
In the second stage, firms decide upon optimal quantities of each type of labour within each 
aggregate skill group. Let the high and low skilled aggregates be nested through a CES 
production function of the various skill sub-types  
( ) , ,
/ 1
2 2 , 1 1 , 2 1
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H H H H H H I H H H
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where ρH ≡ 1 – 1/σH and ρL ≡ 1 – 1/σL. Hence, firms minimise the total wage costs to achieve an 
labour inputs I(.) and J(.) within each category subject to the aggregate expenditure constraints 
for each type of labour 
, 2 2 , 1 1 , H w H w H w H H H = +  
. 3 3 , 2 2 , 1 1 , L w L w L w L w L L L L = + +  
Again, the parameters  i H, a  and  i L, a  are unknown. We apply the same procedure as above to 
find the shares  i H, a  i = 1, 2 and  i L, a , i = 1, 2, 3. First, we derive the shares for the skilled 

























































This can be rewritten to find the Mincer returns of increasing education from high-skilled type 1 




























































































Since,  2 , 1 , 1 H H a a - = , we can find  
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H H H H H H s r b x - + º .  
Therefore, if the ‘Mincer’ return 
j i H H , b  and the amount of schooling 
j i H H s ,  needed to 
become a higher skilled worker is known at this point in time we can identify the share-
parameters  1 , H a  and  2 , H a  for an assumed elasticity of substitution ρH. 
Similarly, if unskilled workers are paid their marginal products, then two skill-premia which 
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These can be rewritten to find the Mincer returns of increasing education from low-skilled type 























































































































































































Since,  3 , 2 , 1 , 1 L L L a a a - - = , we can find  
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L L L L L L s r b x .    12 
Therefore, if we know the ‘Mincer’ return 
j i L L , b  and the amount of schooling 
j i L L s ,  needed 
to become a better skilled worker, at this point in time we can identify the share-parameters 
i L a  
and 
j L a  for an assumed elasticity of substitution ρL. 
In order to calibrate the production parameters we apply country specific Mincer returns for 
the aggregate production technology, the low skilled sub production function and the skilled 
sub-production function. We assume that the country average Mincer rate of return, β, is on 
average 8% per year over all levels of education. This is empirically quite plausible. See also 
Card (1999), Ashenfelter, Oosterbeek, and Harmon (1999), Harmon, Oosterbeek, and Walker 
(2003) for excellent reviews. Country and education specific Mincer returns are employed to 
capture heterogeneity between countries and levels of education. Further, we use different 
Mincer returns to calibrate the aggregate, the nested lower and nested higher CES production 
functions.  














i H e e - - º = p b b b , , 
( ) e ec c - - º p b b , 
where  c
L e ,  c
H e  and  c e  ( c
L e ,  c
H e  and  c e ) denote the average number of years of education in 
country c (the EU) of low skilled workers, skilled workers and all workers, respectively. 
Harmon, Oosterbeek, and Walker (2003) find that each additional year of education on average 
approximately lowers the Mincer rate of return with 1%, hence we set π ≡  0.01. This 
specification allows for higher returns to education for countries with lower average levels of 
education like Spain and Portugal. Returns to education are accordingly smaller for highly 
educated countries like the Scandinavian countries. We approximate the average levels of 
education in each country using data on the education composition of the workforce and making 
an assumption on the number of years of schooling it takes to complete each level of education. 
In particular, ISC01 takes 6 years, ISC2 9 years, ISC34 12 years, ISC56 non-S&E takes 17 
years and ISC56 S&E takes 18 years of education. Table 2.1 gives the corresponding values of 
the Mincer returns used in the calculations. 
These figures imply that  5 , = H L s ,  3
2 1, = L L s ,  3
3 2 = L L s , and  1
2 1, = H H s . In other words, 
aggregate high skilled workers have on average 5 years more education than the average low 
skilled worker. It takes three years of study to get a lower secondary education degree. It takes 
another three years of study to get a higher secondary education degree. And, there is a 
difference of one year between non-S&E and S&E education: science and engineering students 
are enrolled longer for one year than non S&E students. These numbers approximately 
correspond with education systems in many countries, although we admit that differences may   13 
occur. Gathering information on the specific institutional details of all educational systems is 
currently not doable given the time constraints. Moreover, our main results do not depend very 
much on the precise values of these enrolment durations. 
Table 2.1  WorldScan implementation rates of return 
Countries    Mincer agg.  Mincer low  Mincer high   
           
Austria    0.0800  0.0628  0.0972   
Belgium-Luxembourg    0.0750  0.0893  0.0657   
Denmark    0.0732  0.0733  0.0759   
Finland    0.0718  0.0855  0.0663   
France    0.0782  0.0984  0.0598   
Germany    0.0734  0.0719  0.0815   
UK    0.0718  0.0883  0.0635   
Greece    0.0913  0.0837  0.0876   
Ireland    0.0815  0.0836  0.0779   
Italy    0.0924  0.0700  0.1024   
The Netherlands    0.0806  0.0784  0.0822   
Portugal    0.1179  0.0913  0.1066   
Spain    0.0882  0.0945  0.0737   
Sweden    0.0703  0.0831  0.0672   
Czech Republic    0.0787  0.0548  0.1040   
Hungary    0.0785  0.0632  0.0953   
Poland    0.0775  0.0689  0.0887   
Slovakia    0.0786  0.0541  0.1045   
Slovenia    0.0789  0.0643  0.0946   
Rest EU    0.0677  0.0853  0.0624   
           
EU25    0.0800  0.0800  0.0800   
 
In addition, we assume that the elasticity of substitution in the aggregate production function is 
σ = 1.5. The elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers at the aggregate 
level equals about 1-2, see Jacobs (2004) for an extensive review of estimates. At lower 
aggregation levels we expect that elasticities of substitution are substantially bigger for the low 
skilled group. Nevertheless, we are not aware of any empirical results that estimate the elasticity 
of substitution at this disaggregated level. Therefore, we set σL = 3, which is we think a 
plausible number. Within the high skilled group we think that workers with an S&E education 
are not very good substitutes for non-S&E graduates. Therefore we set σH = 1.2. The reason for 
using this low value is that with higher values, the income share of S&E workers becomes 
implausibly large. We did simulations with both higher and lower elasticities of substitution but 
these did not importantly affect the results. Note furthermore that workers within education 
groups are perfect substitutes. 
The labour efficiency parameter A is set at 1 for the initial year. A may be affected due to 
OJT and we return to that below. We assume that the rate of skill-biased technical change at the   14 
macro-level B features a constant growth rate τ so that the time path of B follows from 
1 , ) 1 ( 1 º + = + o t t B B B t , 
where we normalise the number of aggregate efficiency units of skilled labour at time t = 0 to 
unity. We set τ such that wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers increases with 
1.5% per year if relative supplies H/L are constant. Jacobs (2004) summarises empirical 
estimates for the rate of skill-biased technical change and finds that for the US this generates 
approximately a 3% increase in wage differentials per year, but for European countries this 
number seems to be substantially lower. The value of τ follows from log-linearising the 
aggregate marginal rate of transformation between skilled and unskilled workers (at constant 
relative supplies)  
.















With σ = 1.5 and a relative wage increase of 1.5% per year, τ = 0.045. 
In the simulations, we only need to assume that the production function is stable. Having 
fully specified the model, we can simulate the impulses of exogenous changes in the number of 
individuals in the subgroups on the aggregate numbers of workers H and L, cf. the sub 
‘production’ functions. We can also fully capture the general equilibrium responses of changing 
wages between aggregate skill-groups and within these skill-groups. Hence, we capture all 
effects on the income distribution of any policy impulse. Moreover, if we assume that supply of 
various skill groups is completely inelastic then general equilibrium feedback effects of 
WorldScan to the skill sub-block are not relevant and we can compute all the effects on the 
income distribution of the sub-groups. This is may be a rather strong assumption, but schooling 
of individuals does not seem to be very responsive to financial incentives, however, see also 
Jacobs (2004) for a review of estimates.   15 
3  Training on the job 
As a second step, we incorporate on-the-job training in the model. Individuals may not only 
acquire human capital through formal schooling, but also through training over the life-cycle. 
See also Heckman et al. (1998). We use a very stylised model to capture on the job-training 
based on Ben-Porath (1967) and Heckman (1976). Let individual-n’s level of human capital be 
denoted by lower case variables  n t
i h ,  and  n t
i l ,  where t denotes time. We follow Heckman et al. 
(1998) and we assume that  
, , 2 , 1 ,
~ , , , ,
, ,
, 1 , n i h q A h h
i h i h t n
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where  t n
i h q ,
,  and  t n
i l q ,
,  denote the fractions of working time invested in training on the job of 
individual n at time t with skill i, and  A
~  is a productivity parameter. As in Ben-Porath (1967) 
we set  1 , , = = i l i h a a . Heckman et al. (1998) empirically estimate α and find that α equals .95 
for high-school workers and .94 for college graduates. Hence, we do not expect to bias our 
results to a large extent. Further, we assume that  1 , , = = i l i h b b  as well. That is, returns to 
training investments do not diminish with the level of human capital. Here, Heckman et al. 
(1998) find estimates of around .85. Although this assumption is a bit more off-track, this 
assumption allows us to capture changes in OJT very easily through changes in the growth rate 
of the human capital of each group of worker.
3 As in Heckman et al. (1998) we ignore 
depreciation of human capital. They argue that depreciation of human capital is not very high 
because wage profiles do not generally decrease at the end of careers.
4 At the end of working 
careers, investment in OJT is zero (because the returns are too low) and one would expect that 
wages would fall if depreciation was indeed important. Our simulations therefore give a 
plausible upper bound of skill-formation through OJT. 
  We can aggregate all individual investments at time t to obtain aggregates 
 
3
 If β ≠ 1, various cohort and individual (time-) effects in human capital accumulation become inter-twined and we cannot 
easily aggregate over cohorts and individuals at the same time. 
4
 Wages do not even decline at the end of working lives in the US where labour markets are more flexible than in Europe 
and therefore should permit wage declines of older workers when human capital depreciates. 
   16 
















































































































































∑ º c  is the weighted average fraction of time invested in on the job in 












∑ º c . Hence, the growth rates of aggregate human 
capital over time are given by  

















i H c g  

















i L c g  
If the average fraction of time spent in training χ remains constant over time we can equate a 
higher rate of investment in on-the-job training, with a higher growth rate of the number of 
efficiency units of human capital. This is in the current model also equivalent to a higher rate of 
population growth for different skill groups. Needless to say, a constant aggregate fraction of 
time invested in training does not imply that individual training levels are constant over the life-
cycle. Indeed, it is generally optimal for individuals to train at the beginning of the life-cycle 
only (Ben-Porath, 1967; Heckman, 1976; Weiss, 1986). 
Growth rates γi are not necessarily equal across skill groups, depending on the constants 
i h A ,
~  and  i l A ,
~  and investment rates χl,i and χh,i. Not much is known on the sizes of the growth 
rates γi. We assume that  i l i h A A A , ,
~ ~ ~
= º  and χ ≡ χl,i = χh,i so that each skill-group is equally 
productive in generating human capital through OJT and γi = γ = const. In the absence of any 
solid empirical evidence we do not discriminate between skill-groups. From empirical work we 
do know that more skilled workers engage more in formal training, but this largely neglects 
genuine on-the-job training. On the other hand, lower skilled workers -- who have less formal 
education -- are likely to gather more human capital through combining working and learning. 
Mincer (1962) and Heckman (1998), respectively, estimate that a fraction w  of 50% to 23% of 
life-time human capital is gathered through on-the-job training on average over all skill-groups. 
Consequently, we can say that the average growth rate g  must satisfy:   17 
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t is the total population expressed in number of efficiency units of labour, i.e. the total 
number of individuals at time t with skill i multiplied by the number of efficiency units at each 
skill. Therefore we can write: 
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For T = 40 years and ω = 0.23 (Heckman et al., 1998) we find γ = 0.66% per year. If T = 40 and 
ω = 0.50 (Mincer, 1962) we find γ = 1.75% per year. In our base-line we set γ = 1%. This 
corresponds to an average fraction of life-time human capital generated through on-the-job 
training of  33 . ) 1 /( 1 1 = + - = T g w . Hence, formal schooling constitutes about 2/3 of total life-time 
human capital and on-the-job training generates 1/3 of life-time human capital. 
Training on the job is not a costless activity. If χ is the fraction of labour time devoted to 
training on the job, total gross labour earnings will be equal to  H wh ) 1 ( c -  for a skilled worker 
or  L wl ) 1 ( c -  for an unskilled worker (omitting the other sub and super-scripts). Earnings data 
will only give figures on earnings after the costs of on the job-training have been deducted. That 
is, observed yearly wages are  H wh ) 1 ( c -  and not whH. If on-the-job-training efforts increase 
(higher χ) then total effective labour inputs decrease. If on-the-job training was zero in the 
initial situation (χ = 0), then an increase in total on-the-job-training effort to 3% of total time 
decreases total labour input (and earnings!) also with 3%. If the labour income share in total 
output equals 0.7, increasing time devoted to training with 3% will decrease national output 
with about 2.1% initially. Over time, however, stocks of human capital increase and earnings 
increase as a consequence. 
In the simulations we take into account the decrease in labour input (and hence earnings) as 
a consequence of increases in training efforts. We use a short-cut here. In the baseline we 
assume that χ = 0.15 as an average over the population, see Heckman et al (1998, fig. 3). If we 
assume that OJT efforts increase with 3% of total labour time, then total labour input will 
initially decrease with  % 5 . 3
85 . 0
03 . 0 =  as a consequence of OJT. 
Suppose that we allow for OJT in the aggregate production function F(AG(BH,L),X). Since 
OJT affects all labour types equivalently, we can interpret A as a measure for total effective 
labour input. Consequently, we can decompose total labour efficiency into a general efficiency 
term  A¢  and the reduction of labour input due to OJT:      18 
). 1 ( c - ¢ º A A  
Hence, we can model increased OJT by decreasing aggregate labour efficiency A in aggregate 
production once and for all with with 3.5% from A = 1 to A = 0.965. Of course, total labour 
input will recover over time as stocks of human capital increase. 
By using χ = 0.15 as a base-line value, we can infer the base-line productivity of training  A
~  
from solving the human capital growth rate equations for  01 . 0 = g  so that  067 . 0 15 . 0 / 01 . 0
~
= = A . 
Consequently, we can calculate the new growth rate of human capital through OJT as  * * = c g A . 
In the example of a 3% increase in training time the new growth rate is  % 2 . 1 18 . 0 067 . 0 = * = * g  
per year. 
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4  Quality of education 
Human capital in the work force may not only increase by larger quantities of schooling and 
training, but also through a better quality of the educational system. Especially the Lisbon target 
on increasing average literacy scores is aimed at increasing quality of educational output. Since 
this is the only target which is associated with increasing quality we keep matters as simple as 
possible and simulate the effects of reaching the target by simply increasing the average quality 
Q of a unit of human capital generated in formal education from Q = 1 to Q > 1. We assume 
that Q is neither varying across education levels nor over time. We argue below that 
implementing the literacy targets amounts to an across the board increase of educational output 
over all educational types. Furthermore, the increase in quality is assumed to be once and for 
all. 
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5  Labour market 
The stock of workers is not only aggregated over skill-types but also over age-groups. Current 
education policy measures will only affect the flow of each cohort entering the labour market 
now and in the future, not those who are already in the labour market. Therefore, stocks of 
workers only adjust very slowly. To capture these effects, we propose a very stylised model of 
the labour market, see also Jacobs (2004). We ignore country super-scripts, but do allow for 
time superscripts now. 
If we define the in and outflows from the labour force as I
t and O
t, the total population 
t t t L H N + =  evolves through time as  
. 1 t t t t O I N N - + = +  
  We assume that population size grows at constant rate g from time t on, hence 
t t N g N ) 1 ( 1 + = + . Furthermore, we assume that as from t the sizes of new cohorts, as a fraction θ 
of the total population, are constant. Hence, the number of new workers entering the labour 
market grows at rate g as well. This implies that the total inflow of workers at time t is given 
by:  
. t
t N I q =  
Moreover, these assumptions imply that the aggregate outflow rates  g - =q d  are constant as 
well:  
. t
t N O d =  
The inflow and outflow rates are calibrated such that these match average population growth 
rates in various countries over the period considered. The data on population growth are 
provided by UN (2003). 
The total stock of human capital of workers in the skill-groups evolves over time according 
to:  
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where  t
i IH  ( t
i OH ) denotes the inflow (outflow) of skilled workers of type i over time.  1 ³ t
i Q  is 
the general efficiency of education denoting the quality of the new inflow of human capital of 
type i in year t.  t
i Q  captures the improvement in the educational process, due to for example, 
raising literacy scores. We assume that  Q Qt
i = . In the baseline we set  1 = Q . 
Note that  t
i H  and  t
i L  are human capital stocks measured in efficiency units of human 
capital-adjusted for quality increases, since OJT increases the value of human capital stocks.   22 
The total human capital stocks of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers are probably not 
yet at their steady state levels. The reason is that the current population still contains a lot of 
older unskilled workers that are being replaced by better educated younger workers. 
Nevertheless, we assume that the current graduation rates in education are on their ‘steady state’ 
levels and will remain constant from now on. (This is just another way of saying that the 
composition of total investment rate in higher relative to lower education will not change 
anymore. This may be generated through a micro-economic savings function with a constant 
savings quote.) If a fraction  i H, h  of each cohort currently graduates in higher education of type 
i,  H H H h h h = + 2 , 1 , . The corresponding fraction of low skilled workers of each birth cohort are 
denoted by  i L, h , and by definition that  H L L L L h h h h h - = = + + 1 3 , 2 , 1 , . The number of skilled 
(unskilled) workers flowing into the labour market is therefore  t i H
t
i N IH q h , =  (  t i L
t
i N IL q h , =  ). 




i H OH d =  and  t
i
t
i L OL d = . Consequently, the human capital stocks of skilled and unskilled 
workers evolve as:  
, 2 , 1 , ) 1 ( ,
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  The steady state ratio of skilled and unskilled human capital stocks is given by: 











































Hence, if 1/3 of each cohort currently graduates in higher education, the steady state level of 
higher educated workers relative to lower educated workers would be one half. If the population 
does not grow,  d q =  and in the steady state 1/3 of all workers should have a higher education 
degree. 
If the stocks are not at steady state levels (measured in efficiency units) we find the 
following growth rates: 
, 2 , 1 ,
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If the inflow rate equals the outflow rate,  d q = , i.e., there is no population growth, the stocks 
t
i H  and  t
i L  grow at positive rates as long as the graduation rates  t
i H, h   t
i L, h  are larger than the 
current shares  t
t
i N H /  and  t
t
i N L / . 
Given an initial condition ( o o o o o L L L H H 3 2 1 2 1 , , , , ) and the graduation rates 
  )   , ,   , , ( 3 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 , L L L H H h h h h h we can generate the base-line time paths as from time t = 0 to any t 
of the stocks of skilled and unskilled workers. The graduation rates are well documented and we 
use the numbers provided by OECD (2005a). 
If OJT is included in the model, we need to compute the aggregate stocks of human capital 
at time t = 0 if we want to correctly identify the share parameters of the nested CES functions 
(the initial condition ( o o o o o L L L H H 3 2 1 2 1 , , , ,  )). We cannot simply equate  t
i H  and  t
i L  with the 
aggregate numbers of people with either a high or low skilled education.  t
i H  and  t
i L  are the 
aggregate levels of human capital in efficiency units. Hence, we need to take into account that 
workers have already accumulated human capital on-the-job. If  o
i H  denotes the aggregate level 
of human capital in efficiency units at time t = 0 then, we can translate the number of workers 
with skill i,  o
i NH  and  o
i NL , at time t = 0 into human capital stocks  o
i H ,  o
i L  at t = 0 if we 
assume that the average worker is the worker with average working experience (T = 20 if 
working careers are 40 years) and educational quality remained constant over time (Q = 1), i.e.,  
, 2 , 1 , ) 1 ( = + = i NH H o
i
T o
i g  
. 3 , 2 , 1 , ) 1 ( = + = i NL L o
i
T o
i g  
However, the initial share of the labour force that has a degree in S&E education (  o NH2  ) is 
difficult to obtain. We assume that the initial share of S&E workers in the work force equals the 
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6  Assumptions simulations 
Before turning to the simulations we summarise the most important assumptions used in the 
computations. 
1.  We use a country specific Mincer return per extra year of education 
2.  Schooling years from level i to j are assumed to be  5 , = H L s ,  3
2 1, = L L s ,  3
3 2 = L L s ,  1
2 1, = H H s . 
3.  We assume an elasticity of substitution of σ = 1.5 at the aggregate level between skilled and 
unskilled workers, an elasticity of substitution the within the low skilled group of σL = 3. The 
elasticity of substitution between S&E and non-S&E workers is set at σH = 1.2. 
4.  We assume a rate of skill-biased technical change resulting in growing wage differentials 
between skilled and unskilled workers of 1.5% per year (τ = 0.045). Since σ = 1.5, τ = 0.045 
generates a skill-bias in skilled wages of 1.5% per year. 
5.  The average growth rate of the efficiency units of human capital due to OJT is γ = 1% per year 
across all skill-levels. Increasing OJT efforts are modeled by decreases in aggregate labour 
efficiency A. The baseline fraction of working time devoted to OJT  15 . 0 = c . 
6.  The quality-index Q of education is assumed to remain constant and equal to Q = 1. 
7.  We assume that the size of each birth cohort relative to the population remains constant at θ. 
The same holds for the outflow rates of the older people are rate δ. Population grows at a 
constant rate g. The baseline population growth is set on estimated average population growth 
rates. The same holds for in and outflow rates.  
8.  We assume that current graduation rates  i H, h  and  i L, h are at ‘steady state’ levels. 
9.  We allow for ‘catching up’ towards steady state education levels in the baseline if current 
fractions of various types of workers in the work force are below/above graduation rates. 
10.  The average worker in initial situation has accumulated a level of human capital on the job of a 
worker with half of life-time experience. 
11.  Informational requirements for the simulations: initial levels of the number of workers at time t 
= 0,  o
i NH  and  o
i NL , graduation rates  i H, h  and  i L, h , sizes of birth cohorts θ, and sizes of exit 
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7  Simulating the Lisbon targets 
The following list of targets is formulated. We simulate each of them by changing the 
parameters of the model. This section explains how. 
7.1  Early school leavers 
By 2010, an EU average rate of no more than 10% early school leavers should be achieved 
(European Commission, 2004, p54). This implies that less than 10% of each cohort leaves the 
educational system with a higher secondary degree. Since this target perfectly overlaps with 
target number 2, we skipped this target after consulting the EU. 
7.2  Secondary school completion 
By 2010, at least 85% of 22 year olds in the European Union should have completed upper 
secondary education (European Commission, 2004, p25). In WorldScan this targed is 
implemented by imposing the restriction that the average EU fraction of 25-29 year olds should 
have at least an upper secondary education degree. The data for this target are obtained from 
OECD (2005a). That is, we define ε as the fraction of the 25-29 year cohort graduates in upper 
secondray education or more, i.e.,  2 , 1 , 3 , H H L h h h e + + º . We impose an upper limit on this 
fraction ε
max ≡ 0.96. By adopting the weighting procedure used throughout many of the 
simulations, the new (denoted with ‘*’) country specific value of the complement of the lower 
secondary graduation rate can be written as 
) ( max c c c e e l e e - + º *  
where 
c e  is the base year value for country c.  



























c is the number of 25-29 year olds with an upper secondary degree in country c. 
Substitution gives 
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and  85 . 0 = * EU e  is the EU target. By using the value of λ we can compute for each country the 
required increase in the fraction of graduates who should complete secondary school. 
We assume that the increase of graduates in higher secondary education is initially 
completely absorbed by lowering graduation rates in lower-secondary education and that the 
number of graduates without lower secondary education remains constant. Only, in case the 
target implies that the pool of graduates lower secondary education has completely dried up, we 
assume that the remaining graduates come from the pool of graduates with primary education 
and lower. This results in the following expressions for the new graduation rates in each country 
) 1 ( 3 , 2 , 1 , 3 ,
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where  c
L 2 , ˆ h  is an auxiliary variable if there are too few graduates in the lower secondary 
education and the target has to be reached by drawing from the pool of students with only 
primary education.  
Some countries have relatively large graduation rates in the lowest category with only 
primary education or less. Policies to improve transitions between skill levels will probably also 
affect the transition from primary to lower secondary education. Therefore we added a shift 
from primary to lower secondary graduation rates in the following countries: Greece 2%-points, 
Ireland 1%-point, Netherlands 1%-point, Portugal 15%-points and Spain 1%-point. 
Furthermore, in Germany we applied the calculations to the graduation rates of the 30-34 year 
cohorts (instead of 25-29 year cohorts). The reason is that education tracks in Germany are 
typically longer than in the rest of Europe. Table 7.1 gives the values used in the calculations.   29 
 






  Current graduation rates 
 





secondary  ISCO1  ISC2  ISC34  ISC01  ISC2  ISC34 
                 
Austria  0.86  0.89  0.02  0.13  0.69  0.02  0.10  0.73 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.82  0.86  0.05  0.13  0.39  0.05  0.09  0.44 
Denmark  0.87  0.90  0.01  0.12  0.58  0.01  0.09  0.61 
Finland  0.90  0.92  0.01  0.09  0.53  0.01  0.07  0.55 
France  0.78  0.84  0.02  0.20  0.28  0.02  0.14  0.34 
Germany  0.88  0.91  0.01  0.10  0.62  0.01  0.08  0.64 
UK  0.74  0.81  0.01  0.25  0.29  0.01  0.18  0.36 
Greece  0.77  0.83  0.10  0.13  0.53  0.08  0.09  0.59 
Ireland  0.80  0.85  0.08  0.12  0.42  0.07  0.08  0.47 
Italy  0.64  0.74  0.03  0.33  0.52  0.03  0.23  0.62 
Netherlands  0.80  0.85  0.05  0.15  0.51  0.04  0.11  0.56 
Portugal  0.38  0.57  0.43  0.19  0.21  0.29  0.14  0.39 
Spain  0.62  0.73  0.08  0.30  0.21  0.07  0.20  0.32 
Sweden  0.92  0.93  0.01  0.07  0.55  0.01  0.06  0.56 
Czech Republic  0.93  0.94  0.00  0.07  0.83  0.00  0.06  0.84 
Hungary  0.86  0.89  0.01  0.13  0.69  0.01  0.10  0.73 
Poland  0.88  0.91  0.01  0.11  0.60  0.01  0.09  0.63 
Slovakia  0.96  0.96  0.00  0.04  0.82  0.00  0.04  0.82 
Slovenia  0.88  0.91  0.00  0.11  0.68  0.00  0.09  0.71 
Rest EU  0.91  0.93  0.01  0.08  0.51  0.01  0.07  0.53 
                 
EU25  0.80  0.85  0.03  0.17  0.49  0.03  0.12  0.54 
 
7.3  Achievement in literacy 
By 2000, the percentage of low-achieving 15 year olds in reading literacy in the European 
Union should have decreased by at least 20% compared to the year 2000 (European 
Commission, 2004, p28). We simulate the effects of increasing literacy by increasing the wage 
returns of schooling. If literacy improves, the returns to education increase. 
The EU bases this target on resulting PISA test scores. The PISA scores on literacy follow -- 
by construction -- a standard normal distribution with mean µ = 500 and standard deviation σ = 
100. Low achieving 15 year olds are individuals with a PISA-score less than about 407. 
Currently, about 17.2% of the population has a low achievement in literacy. We can compute 
the increase in the mean score (µ
*) or reduction in the standard deviation of scores (σ
*) that are 
needed to meet the Lisbon targets. 
Let  ) , , ( s m p F  denote the cumulative normal distribution up to p with mean µ and standard 
deviation σ. p is the percentile below which students are low achieving. The fraction of low   30 
achieving students decreases from p = 0.172 to p
* = 0.137. Consequently, reaching the Lisbon 
targets follows from solving  
. 137 . 0 ) , , ( = F * * * s m p  
If the mean is increased and the standard deviation is held at old levels (σ
* = σ), then with 
σ = 100 and p
* = 0.137 we find that µ
* = 516. Therefore, average test scores µ need to increase 
with 3% over the whole student body to generate this reduction in low achievement in literacy. 
Similarly, we may hold mean scores fixed at µ = 500 and reduce the standard deviation from 
σ = 100 to σ
* = 85. Hence, a reduction of 15% in the standard deviation is needed to generate 
the target reduction in low literacy achievement. We prefer to use the first interpretation (an 
increase in the mean) since a reduction in the standard deviation implies that the fraction of 
high-performing students is reduced as well. We cannot imagine that this would be EU policy. 
An increase of 3% on the average of the test scores equals 16% of one standard deviation 
( s m 16 . = D ). From empirical estimates we can infer the wage returns of higher literacy scores as 
measured in standard deviations. Krueger (2000, p.21-22) summarises some recent empirical 
research in this field, see Table7.2. Krueger estimates that the wage returns to higher math and 
literacy scores are in the order of 8-20% per standard deviation increase. 
Table 7.2      Returns to literacy 
Study  Return per standard deviation increase scores 
   
                       % 
   
Murnane, Willet and Levy (1995)  7.7-10.9 
Currie and Thomas (1999)  7.6-8 
Neal and Johnson (1996)  20 
 
Empirical evidence gives a rather scattered picture. We are inclined to think that a 10% return 
per standard deviation in tests scores is reasonable. Krueger (2000) uses a value of 8% in his 
calculations. With a return of 10% per standard deviation in test scores, a  s 16 .  increase in the 
average scores on literacy implies a monetary return of 1.6% in wages. We therefore increase 
the average quality of human capital of all school-leavers with 1.6% across all schooling types 
hence Q will rise from  1 = EU Q  to  016 . 1 = * EU Q . Therefore, nothing happens with the skill 
composition of the work force as a result of an equal increase in the level of human capital over 
all workers. With a Mincer return of 8% per year of schooling, a 1.6% increase in wages is 
equivalent to the increase in wages due to 0.2 additional years of schooling on average for all 
workers as a result of this literacy increase. 
In order to implement the country specific targets we we follow the same procedure as 
before to achieve an increase on average of 1.6% for the EU as a whole. In particular, we again 
set a max ε
max = 0.95, where ε now designates the fraction of each cohort which has a reading   31 
proficiency level 1 and above. The data are obtained from OECD (2005b). The new (denoted 
with ‘*’) country specific value of the reading proficiency target can again be written as 
) ( max c c c e e l e e - + º *  
where ε
c is the old value of reading proficiency above level 1 for country c. 



























c is now the number of 25-29 year olds with reading proficiency level above 1 in 
country c. Substitution gives 












and  863 . 0 137 . 0 1 = - = * EU e  is the EU reading proficiency target. Again, by using the value of λ 
we can compute for each country the required increase in the fraction of graduates who should 
complete secondary school. This generates a country specific quality increase of the education 
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016 . 0
c c
c c Q Q
e e  
where  1 = c Q  and the numbers in the denominator correspond to the old and new average EU 
fractions of the number of pupils with reading proficiency level below 1. Table 7.3 gives the 
country specific values used in the calculations.   32 
 
Table 7.3      WorldScan implementation literacy 
  Fraction op population  Lisbon target  Quality adjustment 
  Above reading proficiency level 1  Reading proficiency level 1   
Austria  0.86  0.89  1.010 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.82  0.86  1.016 
Denmark  0.82  0.86  1.016 
Finland  0.93  0.94  1.002 
France  0.85  0.88  1.012 
Germany  0.77  0.83  1.021 
UK  0.87  0.90  1.010 
Greece  0.76  0.82  1.024 
Ireland  0.89  0.91  1.007 
Italy  0.81  0.86  1.017 
Netherlands  0.91  0.92  1.005 
Portugal  0.74  0.81  1.026 
Spain  0.84  0.88  1.014 
Sweden  0.87  0.90  1.009 
Czech Republic  0.83  0.87  1.015 
Hungary  0.77  0.83  1.022 
Poland  0.77  0.83  1.022 
Slovakia  0.82  0.86  1.016 
Slovenia  0.82  0.86  1.016 
Rest EU  0.82  0.86  1.016 
       
EU25  0.82  0.86  1.016 
 
7.4  Life-long learning 
By 2010, the European Union average level of participation in Lifelong Learning should be at 
least 12.5% of the adult working age population (25-64 age group) (European Commission, 
2004, p51). Currently, the EU average of workers that participated in training programs in the 
last month is 8,5% of the work force. If we assume that each training program costs one 
working day per week, then the current fraction of labour time devoted to training activities 
equals  % 7 . 1 % 5 . 8 20 / 4 = *  of total labour time, based on 20 working days per month. This is 
equivalent to 1.7% of total working time per year. The target implies that the fraction of the 
workforce participating in training during the last month increases to 12.5% of the work-force. 
Hence total labour time devoted to training activities has to increase to 2,5% because 
% 5 . 2 5 . 12 20 / 4 = * . Consequently, total labour time devoted to formal training activities 
increases from 1.7% to 2.5%, which results in the new fraction of training time  158 . 0 = * c . 
Therefore, the EU new average growth rate of OJT will become  % 06 . 1 158 . 0 067 . 0 = * = * EU g  
per year. Furthermore, aggregate labour input in the Lisbon scenario will decrease from  1 = A  to    33 
99 . 0
15 . 0 1
158 . 0 1
1










We allow for a country specific implementation of the Lisbon target. First we compute the 
country specific change in the fraction of the population that participates in life long learning. 
Data are taken from the European Commision (2004). We set  25 . 0 max = e  and the target is 
125 . 0 = * EU e . Now ε denotes the fraction of the population participating in training. Hence,  
) ( max c c c e e l e e - + º *  
where ε
s is the old fraction of the population engaging in training in country c. 



























c is now the total population in country c. Substitution of the last results gives 
( ). max EU EU EU e e l e e - + = *  
The new growth rates of human capital generated through OJT follow from the new country 
specific fraction of people engaged in training, i.e.,  
c c c c c e e c + - º * * ) (
20
4  













Table 7.4 gives the country specific values which are used to implement this target.    34 
Table 7.4  WorldScan implementation training 
  % of population  Lisbon target   New fraction  New growth  Initial decrease 
  in training  in training  time in OJT  rate OJT  labour efficiency 
           
Austria  0.0750  0.1211  0.1592  0.0106  0.9891 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.0670  0.1152  0.1596  0.0106  0.9886 
Denmark  0.1840  0.2014  0.1535  0.0102  0.9959 
Finland  0.1890  0.2051  0.1532  0.0102  0.9962 
France  0.0270  0.0858  0.1618  0.0108  0.9862 
Germany  0.0590  0.1094  0.1601  0.0107  0.9882 
UK  0.2290  0.2345  0.1511  0.0101  0.9987 
Greece  0.0120  0.0747  0.1625  0.0108  0.9852 
Ireland  0.0770  0.1226  0.1591  0.0106  0.9893 
Italy  0.0460  0.0998  0.1608  0.0107  0.9873 
Netherlands  0.1640  0.1867  0.1545  0.0103  0.9947 
Portugal  0.0290  0.0873  0.1617  0.0108  0.9863 
Spain  0.0500  0.1027  0.1605  0.0107  0.9876 
Sweden  0.1840  0.2014  0.1535  0.0102  0.9959 
Czech Republic  0.0600  0.1101  0.1600  0.0107  0.9882 
Hungary  0.0330  0.0902  0.1614  0.0108  0.9865 
Poland  0.0430  0.0976  0.1609  0.0107  0.9872 
Slovakia  0.0900  0.1322  0.1584  0.0106  0.9901 
Slovenia  0.0880  0.1307  0.1585  0.0106  0.9900 
Rest EU  0.0350  0.0917  0.1613  0.0108  0.9867 
           
EU25  0.0803  0.1250  0.1589  0.0106  0.9895 
 
7.5  Science & engineering 
The total number of graduates in mathematics, science and technology in the European Union 
should increase by at least 15% by 2010 while at the same time the level of gender imbalance 
should decrease (European Commission, 2004, p34). The first target amounts to increasing 
2 , H h  with 15% on average for all countries. We implement this target by subjecting all 
countries equally to this target, i.e,  c
H
c
H 2 , 2 , 15 . 1 h h = * . At the same time the number of students in 








H h h h h - - =
* * . Data are taken 
from OECD (2004). Table 7.5 shows the numerical implementation of this target in WorldScan.    35 
Table 7.5  WorldScan implementation S&E 
                  Graduation rate                   Lisbon grad. rate 
  Non S&E  S&E  Non S&E  S&E 
         
Austria  0.1154  0.0476  0.1082  0.0547 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.3211  0.1040  0.3055  0.1196 
Denmark  0.2420  0.0474  0.2349  0.0545 
Finland  0.2489  0.1181  0.2311  0.1358 
France  0.3516  0.1523  0.3288  0.1752 
Germany  0.1829  0.0868  0.1698  0.0998 
UK  0.3145  0.1306  0.2949  0.1502 
Greece  0.1782  0.0569  0.1697  0.0654 
Ireland  0.2715  0.1055  0.2557  0.1214 
Italy  0.0924  0.0295  0.0879  0.0339 
Netherlands  0.2458  0.0481  0.2385  0.0553 
Portugal  0.1301  0.0433  0.1236  0.0498 
Spain  0.3084  0.1026  0.2930  0.1180 
Sweden  0.2507  0.1201  0.2327  0.1381 
Czech Republic  0.0794  0.0272  0.0753  0.0313 
Hungary  0.1485  0.0166  0.1460  0.0191 
Poland  0.2493  0.0300  0.2448  0.0345 
Slovakia  0.1002  0.0381  0.0944  0.0439 
Slovenia  0.1460  0.0556  0.1376  0.0639 
Rest EU  0.3603  0.0400  0.3543  0.0460 
         
EU25  0.2547  0.0941  0.2406  0.1082 
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